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Comments
Abatement of Actions in Louisiana
At common law, all pending personal actions abated on the
death of a party. If the cause of action itself survived, a new
action could be commenced by or against the personal repre-
sentatives of the deceased party.' Tort actions did not survive
the death of either party.2 An action did not lie for the recovery
of damages for wrongful death.3 These harsh rules have now
been abrogated, wholly or largely, in every common law juris-
1. Annot., 92 A.L.R. 956 (1934).
2. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 949-51 (1941). By statute,
however, torts affecting personal property survived the plaintiff in favor of
his administrator or executor. This was the only exception to the general
rule at early common law.
3. Higgins v. Butcher, Yelverton 90, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1606).
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diction. Today all American states have adopted legislation,
modeled more or less on Lord Campbell's Act,4 providing a
right of action for wrongful death.5 "Survival statutes," adopted
in the great majority of common law jurisdictions, now provide
that the cause of action to recover for injuries suffered survives
in favor of designated survivors if the injured party dies6 and
against the personal representatives of the tortfeasor if the lat-
ter dies.7 Similarly, the rule as to abatement of personal actions
on the death of a party has been abrogated by statute in vir-
tually all jurisdictions. Some of these statutes provide that
pending actions do not abate, and can be revived by the proper
parties if "the cause of action would have survived." The ma-
jority of these legislative acts, however, contain no such express
reference to survival of actions, and provide that, with certain
stated exceptions, pending actions do not abate on the death
of a party. These latter statutes have caused considerable diffi-
culty, and have been interpreted in three different ways by
the courts. First, some courts have construed them strictly, as
being applicable only to pending actions where the cause of
action survives. Second, in other jurisdictions they have been
construed liberally in an effort to give effect to the legislative
intent and have been held to prevent the abatement of all pend-
ing actions on the death of a party, save those included within
the statutory exceptions. Third, under a similarly liberal con-
struction, but by a somewhat different process of reasoning, other
American courts have held that these statutory provisions sup-
plement the statutes providing for the survival of causes of
action, and that in rendering the pending action revivable they
necessarily render the cause of action survivable.8
Under Roman law, the recovery of damages for wrongful
death was limited to two narrow sets of circumstancesY On
4. 9 & 10 VICT. C. 93 (1846). This statute only covered injuries sustained
by the death.
5. Pound, Comments on Recent Important Admiralty Cases, 13 NACCA
L.J. 162, 189 (1954).
6. Ibid.
7. The statutes of forty-thrde of the American states now provide for
the survival of causes of action against deceased tortfeasors. Cox v. Roth,
99 Sup. Ct. 190, 192 (1955).
8. The cases on the subject are collected and analyzed in Annot., 92
A.L.R. 956 (1934).
9. Under the actio de effusis vel dejectis, a person occupying a house
abutting on a highway was liable for the injury or death of another caused
by anything thrown or poured from the house, regardless of fault. DIGEST
9.3.2. Damages could also be recovered for the wrongful or negligent killing
of a slave. DIGEST 9.2.23.
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the other hand, death played a much lesser role in preventing
the enforcement of delictual and quasi-delictual obligations than
it played under abatement of actions and survival of causes of
actions at common law. Under Roman law, the right of action
on all quasi-delicts,"' and on all delicts" except injuria,'2 on the
death of the injured person devolved on his heirs. Originally,
these actions could not be brought against the heirs of the wrong-
doer; 13 but this harsh result was mitigated later through the
adoption of the rule that the wrongdoer's heirs were liable for
his commission of a delict, to the extent that the estate had
been enriched thereby.14 The full extent to which extinction of
actions by the death of a party was avoided under Roman law,
however, cannot be accurately gauged without taking into ac-
count the effect of the litis contestatio.5 Litiscontestation worked
a procedural novation of the right of action and the obligation
by the action itself.'0 After litis contestatio, the action was not
extinguished by the death of the party; 17 and even the actio
injuriarum, after this stage of the proceeding had been reached,
could be continued by or against the heirs of the deceased
party.'8
Spanish law of the eighteenth century apparently had not
yet developed to the point where it permitted any recovery
for wrongful death. 19 The Spanish counterparts of the common
10. DIGEST 47.1.1; INSTITUTES 4.12.pr.
11. GAIUS 4.112.
12. DIGEST 47.10.13.pr.
13. GAIUS 4.112.
14. DIGEST 9.2.23.
15. During the period of the legis actiones the litis contestatio was that
stage of the proceeding at which an issue was arrived at before the praetor
(in jure), to be tried in judicio by a judex. During the formulary period the
litis contestatio was reached when the praetor, after hearing both parties,
had drawn up the formula, naming the judex, and briefly describing the issue
to be tried, and the allegations of the parties. LEAGE, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW
363 (1909); WENGER, INSTITUTES OF THE ROMAN LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 175-90
(Fisk transl. 1940).
16. LEAGE, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 375 (1909); WENGER, INSTITUTES OF THE
ROMAN LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 184 (Fisk transl. 1940).
17. DIGEST 50.17.139.
18. DIGEST 47.10.13.pr. The rules of the Roman law relating to delictual
and quasi-delictual actions brought by the.heirs of the injured person, or
against the heirs of the deceased wrongdoer, and to the continued existence
of the action itself after litis contestatio, are discussed in Voss, The Recov-
ery of Damages for Wrongful Death at Common Law, at Civil Law, and in
Louisiana, 6 TUL. L. REV. 201, 212-15 (1932); and Oppenheim, The Survival
of Tort Actions and the A6ion for Wrongful Death, 16 TUL. L. REV. 386,
400-04 (1942).
19. In Hubgh v. New Orleans & Carrolton R.R., 6 La. Ann. 495, 496, 54
Am. Dec. 565 (1851), the statement is made that Spanish law did not permit
the recovery of damages for wrongful death. Nothing was found in the
Spanish law of that period and earlier which indicated that this statement
[VoL. XV
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law rules on abatement of actions and survival of causes of
actions had developed through the broadening of the applica-
tion, rather than the changing, of the basic rules of Roman law.
After the death of the injured person, an action could be brought
by his heirs to recover damages to his property caused by the
wrongful act of the defendant.20 An action to recover damages
for a wrongful act could be brought against the heirs who had
accepted the succession of the wrongdoer, but recovery was
limited to the extent to which the heirs had profited from the
wrongful act.21 But, as under Roman law, the full extent to
which extinction of actions by the death of a party was avoided
could not be seen without taking into account the effect of litis
contestatio. Under Spanish law, no pending action was extin-
guished by the death of a party after litiscontestation, 22 which
was now that stage of the proceeding when the defendant
answered the plaintiff's petition.23
Post-revolutionary French law had progressed far enough
to permit the solution of all of these problems through the appli-
cation of the code provisions relating to responsibility for wrong-
ful acts, and the transmission of rights and obligations under
the law of successions. The basic article on delictual and quasi-
delictual responsibility provided that "every act whatever of
man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault
it happened to repair it."'24 Under its provisions, the heirs of a
person killed through the fault of another could recover the
damages which they sustained through his death.25 Further,
these heirs could also recover, on the death of the injured per-
son, damages for injuries which he had received through the
fault of another.2 6 Conversely, the heirs who had accepted the
was erroneous. On the contrary LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 7.15.1, 7.15.2, 7.15.3, and
7.9.11 strongly support this position by implication. It is probable that it
was not until 1889, when the C6DIGO CIVIL was adopted, that Spanish law
permitted a recovery for wrongful death.
20. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 7.9.11, 7.15.2.
21. Id. at 7.15.3.
22. Id. at 3.5.23, 7.15.3. See also FEBREIo, LIBRERIA DE ESCRIsANOS, parte II,
libro III, tomo I, at 130 (1790).
23. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 3.10.3.
24. CODE CIVIL art. 1382.
25. 6 PLANIOL ET RiPERT, TRAIT9 PRATIQUE DR DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS, no 549
(2d ed. 1952); 2 SAVATIER, TRAITt DE LA RESPONSABILITt CIVILE EN DROIT FRANQAIS no
539 (2d ed. 1951); 4 ZACHARIAE, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no 625, at 17, nn. 10, 11
(Mass6 et Verg6 transl. 1856); id. no 627, at 20.
26. 2 MAZEAUD, TRAIT2 THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITt CIVILE
DELICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE nos 1900-02 (3d ed. 1939); 6 PLANIOL ET RIPERT,
TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS no 658 (2d ed. 1952) 2 SAVATIER, TRAIT;A
DE LA RESPONSABILITt CIVILE EN DROIT FRAN AIS no 629 (2d ed. 1951).
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succession of the wrongdoer were liable for the damages result-
ing from his delicts and quasi-delicts. 27 A system of law which
recognized rights of action and obligations ex delicto and quasi
ex delicto as heritable, and as being transmitted to the heirs
who accepted the succession of the obligee and obligor, re-
spectively, needed no procedural rules to prevent the extinction
of a pending action by the death of a party.
Even prior to the adoption of the Code of Practice of 1825,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana refused to adopt the common
law rules of abatement of actions, and applied the Spanish pro-
cedural rule that a pending action is not extinguished by the
death of a party after answer filed.28 In the twin Codes of 1825,
the redactors took every precaution to preclude subsequent
jurisprudential recognition of the common law rules of survival
of causes of action and abatement.of actions. In these respects,
French legal theory was utilized in both Codes, with Spanish
procedural theory additionally being relied on in the Code of
Practice. The basic substantive provision on delictual and quasi-
delictual responsibility was taken verbatim from the French
Civil Code.29 Rights of action to enforce obligations, on the
death of the obligee, were transmitted to his heirs.30 This rule
included rights of action to enforce obligations ex delicto and
quasi ex delicto.3' Obligations, even those resulting from crimes,
3 2
27. 2 SAVATIER, TRAITA DE LA RESPONSABILIT2 CIVILE EN DROIT FRANCAIs no 632
(2d ed. 1951); 2 ZACHARIAE, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS no 384, at 327, n. 2 (Mass6 et
Verg6 transl. 1856).
28. Rochon v. Montreuil, 4 Mart.(o.s.) 485 (La. 1816); Lebeau v. Lafon's
Executors, 1 Mart.(N.s.) 705 (La. 1823).
29. Art. 2294, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1825, now Art. 2315, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
The French original of this article is identical with CODE CIVIL art. 1382.
30. Art. 939, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1825, now Art. 945, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870:
"The second effect of this right [of succession] is to authorize the heir to
institute all the actions, even possessory ones, which the deceased had a
right to institute, and to prosecute those already commenced. For the heir,
in every thing, represents the deceased, and is of full right in his place
as well for his rights as his obligations." (Emphasis added.) There Is no cor-
responding article In either the Code Civil or the so-called Louisiana Civil
Code of 1808. See, to substantially the same effect as the quoted article, Arts.
22, 23, 113, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1825.
31. Arts. 22, 28, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1825.
32. Art. 25, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1825: "Heirs or universal legatees
may be sued for civil reparation of the injury caused by the crimes or mis-
demeanors of the deceased, whose succession they have accepted, although
no action was instituted for that purpose against the deceased during his
life, and although neither he nor his heirs have been benefited by such an
offense."
The redactors assigned the following reasons for recommending the
adoption of the proposed article: "Law 3, tit. 15, Partida 7, gives the right
of action against the heirs, for the civil reparation of the crime or misde-
meanor committed by the deceased, to whom they succeed, only when the
action had been commenced against the deceased, or when the heirs have
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could be enforced against the heirs who had accepted the suc-
cession of the obligor.83  "Actions do not abate by the death of
one of the parties after answer filed." 34 "If after issued joined,
either the plaintiff or defendant die, it is not necessary to recom-
mence the action; it continues between the surviving party and
the heirs of the one deceased."3 5 Implicit in the rule against
abatement, of course, was the exception as to the strictly per-
sonal obligation, "when none but the obligee can enforce the
performance, or when it can be enforced only against the
obligor."3 6 The first breach in these civilian rules occurred in
Hubgh v. New Orleans & Carrolton R.R,37 where the court
refused to allow the recovery of damages by the heirs of the
deceased for his wrongful death, despite the fact that the perti- -
nent code provision had been taken verbatim from the corre-
sponding article of the Code Civil, which had consistently been
interpreted in France as authorizing a recovery for wrongful
death. In due course, the legislature overturned this decision
by amending the pertinent article to provide for the survival
of the right of action if the injured person died"8 and to allow the
recovery by the designated survivors of the damages which they
profited by the crime. That provision of the law, which is yet in force,
seems unjust; for, should any one kill a slave, there is no good reason why
the owner of that slave should not recover the value from the heirs of the
murderer, who have voluntarily accepted the succession of the deceased,
and profited of his wealth, although his property was not increased by his
crime. This reasoning induced us to follow the rule laid down by Domat,
which gives in all cases this action against the heirs who have succeeded
to the person who committed the offence. Domat, part. 1, book 1, tit. 1,
sect. 10, No. 3." Projet of the Louisiana Code of Practice of 1825, 2 LA. LEGAL
ARCHIVES 6 (1937).
33. Arts. 33, 40, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1825.
34. Art. 21, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1825. See also Art. 939, LA. CIVIL CODE
of 1825, quoted in note 30 supra.
DIGEST 50.17.139; LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 3.5.23; and Rochon v. Montreuil, 4
Mart.(o.s.) 485 (La. 1816) are cited as the sources of article 21. Projet of
the Louisiana Code of Practice of 1825, 2 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES 5 (1937).
35. Art. 361, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1825.
36. Art. 1992, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1825, now Art. 1997, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
For an express recognition of this exception, see Art. 937, LA. CIVIL CODE of
1825, now Art. 943, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
37. 6 La. Ann. 495, 54 Am. Dec. 565 (1851). For excellent discussions
of the far-reaching effect of the Hubgh case, and of the strict construction
of Art 2315, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, which followed in its wake, see Oppen-
helm, The Survival of Tort Actions and the Action for Wrongful Death, 16
TUL. L. REV. 386 (1942); Voss, The Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Death
at Common Law, at Civil Law, and in Louisiana, 6 TUL. L. REV. 201 (1932).
38. La. Acts 1855, No. 223, p. 270, amending Art. 2294, LA. CIVIL CODE of
1825, by adding "the right of this action shall survive in case of death in
favor of the minor children and widow of the deceased or either of them,
and in default of these in favor of the surviving father and mother, or
either of them, for the space of one year from the death."
1955]
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sustained from the wrongful death.30 Yet, in Chivers v. Roger,40
where a survivor brought an action to recover for the wrongful
death of his son and died after the case had been tried, the
action was held to have abated on the death of the plaintiff.
Under a strict construction of the amended code provision, it
was held that the action was not transmitted to plaintiff's heirs,
despite the rule preventing abatement by the death of a party
after answer filed. A legislative reversal of this decision like-
wise was attempted, when in 1946 an act was adopted providing
that "there are no exceptions to the rule that an action does
not abate by the death of one of the parties thereto after issue
joined therein."'41 In Gabriel v. United Theatres, this legisla-
tion was swept aside by the court on the ground that it had
been repealed impliedly by a subsequent amendment4 2 to article
2315 of the Civil Code-the basic article on delictual and quasi-
delictual responsibility.
In McConnell v. Webb 43 the 1946 act was again considered.
The original plaintiff, alleging that the defendant had charged
more than the maximum rental allowed under the Federal Hous-
ing and Rent Act, sued to recover treble damages. After perfect-
ing an appeal from an adverse judgment, the plaintiff died. His
widow, in her capacity of administratrix, filed a motion to be
substituted as party plaintiff-appellant. After argument before
the Supreme Court, appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the
39. La. Acts 1884, No. 71, p. 94, amending Art. 2315, LA. CIVIL CODE of
1870-corresponding to Art. 2294, LA. CIvIL CODE of 1825--by adding "the sur-
vivors above mentioned may also recover the damages sustained by them
by the death of the parent or child, or husband or wife, as the case may be."
40. 50 La. Ann. 57, 23 So. 100 (1898). This case has been followed con-
sistently by the courts in Louisiana. Hardtner v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 189 So. 365 (La. App. 1939); Hebert v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 267
(E.D. La. 1941); Bounds v. T. L. James & Co., 124 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. La.
1954).
In the Chivers case, the court distinguished the earlier case of Vincent
v. Sharp, 9 La. Ann. 463 (1854), where the plaintiff had died pending appeal
from a judgment awarding him damages for injuries sustained through the
fault of the defendant. The distinction employed was that in the Sharp
case the action had been merged into a judgment which, as a property
right, was transmitted on his death to his heirs. The Sharp case has been
followed consistently. Castelluccio v. Cloverland Dairy Products Co., 165 La.
606, 115 So. 796 (1927); Williams v. Campbell, 185 So. 683 (La. App. 1938);
Foy v. Little, 197 So. 313 (La. App. 1939), 15 TUL. L. REV. 135 (1940).
41. La. Acts 1946, No. 239, p. 738. This statute is discussed in Louisiana
Legislation of 196-Civil Procedure, 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 36-38 (1946).
42. 221 La. 219, 59 So.2d 127 (1952), 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 518 (1953).
The court overlooked the fact that La. Acts 1946, No. 239, p. 738, had been
incorporated into LA. R.S. 13:3349 (1950), and that this later expression of
legislative will should have prevailed over any 1948 legislation. La. Acts 1948,
No. 333, p. 808.
43. 76 So.2d 405 (La. 1954).
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ground that the district court had dismissed the original plain-
tiff's suit and as he died subsequently, no cause of action re-
mained. The Supreme Court held that the action abated with
the death of the party who instituted it, notwithstanding the pro-
visions of R.S. 13:3349 that "there are no exceptions to the rule
that an action does not abate by the death of one of the parties
thereto after issue joined therein." In the course of its opinion,
the Supreme Court recognized the fact that the 1946 act, held
impliedly repealed in the Gabriel case, had been incorporated
into R.S. 13:3349.44 The court concluded, nevertheless, that de-
spite the imperative language of the statute, strictly personal
rights and obligations necessarily had to be excepted.4 5 Having
reached this conclusion, the court then proceeded to hold, by
analogy to a decision 46 involving statutory damages under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, that the treble damage provision was
penal, and that the claim abated on the death of the plaintiff.
Unfortunately the attention of the court was not called to certain
federal decisions which probably would have changed the result.
The nature of statutory damages has produced conflicting views
in the federal courts, 47 which have attempted to characterize the
statutory provisions as either penal or remedial. If penal, the
action abates on the death of a party; if remedial, the cause of
action survives. Further, in Murfkan v. Kahn,4S where plaintiff
died after instituting suit to recover treble damages under the
Federal Housing and Rent Act, the court held the statutory pro-
visions remedial. The action was held not to have abated, and
the court permitted the administratrix of his estate to be sub-
44. Art. 21, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870, and LA. R.S. 13:3349 (1950) were
both amended last year, by La. Acts 1954, No. 57, p. 119, and No. 59, p. 121,
respectively. The primary purpose of these amendments was to change the
rule against the abatement of the action by the death of a party after issue
joined to one against abatement by the death of a party after institution
of suit. The amendment to article 21, however, indirectly excludes actions
to enforce strictly personal rights and obligations from the scope of the
article. For a discussion of these amendatory acts, see Survey of 1954 Legis-
lation-Courts and Judicial Procedure, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 39-42 (1954).
45. Art. 21, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870, had been so construed in Suc-
cession of Jones, 120 La. 986, 45 So. 965 (1907); Succession of Deshotels, 144
La. 580, 80 So. 883 (1919); and Succession of Coco, 183 La. 517, 164 So. 326
(1935); cf. Johnson v. Levy, 118 La. 447, 43 So. 46, 9 L.R.A.(N.s.) 1020, 118
Am. St. Rep. 378, 10 Ann. Cas. 722 (1907).
46. Caillouet v. American Sugar Refining Co., 250 Fed. 639 (E.D. La.
1917).
47. For instance, in Caillouet v. American Sugar Refining Co., 280 Fed.
639 (E.D. La. 1917) and Haskell v. Perkins, 28 F.2d 222 (D.N.J. 1928), it was
held that the statutory damages provision of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
was penal. In Hicks v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 87 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.
1937), the court held this provision remedial.
48. 11 F.R.D. 520 (S.D. Fla. 1951).
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stituted as plaintiff. The precise point decided, however, is of no
great importance, as there are few suits for treble damages under
the Housing and Rent Act pending. The feature of McConnell v.
Webb which provides the greatest cause for concern is its lan-
guage that "the common law rule to the effect that a personal
action for damages for a tort expires at the death of the party
who instituted it was adopted in the jurisprudence of this court
many years ago and is still adhered to."'49 Actually, the common
law rules of abatement of the action on the death of a party have
never been followed in Louisiana; for if they had, a tort action
would always abate on the death of a party, and the cause of
action would never survive. What has been adopted by the
Louisiana courts has been the same judicial technique which
some of the common law courts have employed in the strict and
narrow construction of statutes intended to abrogate common
law rules, of abatement. It is to be hoped that this unfortunate
language in the McConnell case will not permit the reception of
harsh procedural rules from jurisdictions which long ago re-
pudiated them.
In its revision of the Code of Practice, the Council of the
Louisiana State Law Institute has recommended changes in the
present statutory rules on the subject. Its recommended article5"
provides that an action does not abate on the death of a party
after institution of suit; that the only exceptions thereto are
actions to enforce rights and obligations strictly personal, and
those clearly provided by subsequent legislation; that when an
49. 76 So.2d 405, 407 (La. 1954).
50. Article 9 of the proposed title on civil actions, as amended by the
Council of the Institute on January 15, 1954, reading as follows:
"An action does not abate on the death of a party. The only exceptions
to this rule are actions to enforce rights and obligations which are strictly
personal, and exceptions provided expressly, or by necessary Implication,
by statutes adopted hereafter.
"When an action is brought under Article 2315 of the Civil Code by
the injured party, upon his death it survives in favor of a survivor desig-
nated therein, if there be one, and the latter may be substituted as party
plaintiff. Otherwise, when a party to an action dies his heirs, legatees,
administrator, or executor, as the case may be, may be substituted as
parties."
To anticipate the possible objection that, through its incorporation Into
the proposed new Code of Practice the legislature did not intend to make
any change in the substantive law, the Council of the Institute also recom-
mends the adoption of a special statute, reading as follows:
"An action does not abate on the death of a party after suit has been
filed. The only exceptions to this rule are actions to enforce rights and
obligations which are strictly personal, and exceptions provided expressly,
or by necessary implication, by statutes adopted hereafter.
"The survivors, heirs, legatees, administrator, or executor as the case
may be, of the deceased party may be substituted as parties as provided by
Article - (Civil Actions, Art. 9) of the CODE OF PRACTICE."
[VOL . XV
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action is brought under article 2315 of the Civil Code by an
injured party who then dies, the survivor, if any, designated in
article 2315 may be substituted as party plaintiff; and that in all
other cases, when a party dies, his heirs, legatees, administra-
tor, or executor may be substituted as parties. It is to be hoped
that the proposed article will be adopted, and thereafter will be
construed as a legislative overruling of the unfortunate line of
cases commencing with the Chivers case and extending through
the McConnell decision. Both the legislative history of the Lou-
isiana rule against abatement, and two of the three lines of de-
cisions construing similar statutory rules in the various Ameri-
can jurisdictions, would call for such a construction. But the
only certain way of overturning these unfortunate decisions
would be to supplement the proposed article with an amend-
ment to article 2315 of the Civil Code, recognizing rights of
action ex delicto and quasi ex delicto as property rights trans-
mitted to the heirs of the obligee on his death.
John M. Shaw
Sufficiency of Indictments
Interpretation of Article 227 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure
An indictment at common law was required to present the
facts of the crime with elaborate detail.1 This requirement has
received considerable criticism 2 and the modern trend has been
to limit by statute the detail formerly required in an indict-
ment.3 Article 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that all crimes in the Criminal Code may be charged by a "short
form" indictment, which contains only a statement of the very
1. See an example in Comment, Indictment Forms-A Technical Loop-
hole for the Accused, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 461 (1945).
2. See Holtzoff, Reform of Federal Criminal Procedure, 12 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 119 (1944); Comment, Indictment Forms-A Technical Loophole for
the Accused, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 461 (1946); Comment, The Short Form
Indictment-History, Development and Constitutionality, 6 LOUISIANA LAW
REVEW 78 (1944); Note, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 693 (1947).
3. In regard to the short form, see ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
154 (1930); for legislation comparable to article 227 of the Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure, which sets forth the requisites for the long form
indictment, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 958 (Deering 1949); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 9-1105 (Burns 1933); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.17 (1945); NEV. COMP. LAWS
§ 10856 (1929); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-21-8 (1953).
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